implications for the international literature on policy convergence. 6 It also contributes to scholarship that has explored themes in Canada-US comparative histories of values and institutions, higher education, and technology regulation. 7 This research has examined contrasting styles of regulation in a number of fields, including alachlor, dioxins, farmed salmon, pulp and paper, and radon. 8 Scholarship on technology policy has receive less attention. 9 The University of British Columbia political scientists, Kathryn Harrison and George Hoberg in their paper on regulation of dioxins and radon gas outlined six major forces behind agenda-setting in North American environmental: (i) policy entrepreneurs, whether in government or interest; (ii) media; (iii) science and technology; (iv) cross-border influences; (v) government structures; and (vi) culture. There are common forces explored in this paper, in particular the "policy entrepreneurs" at the National Academy of Sciences, cross-border influences (moving in both directions across the border), and, most profoundly, culture.
In the case of Canada, the cultural thesis accords with MacLeod and Jarrell's view that "there is much to be said about the importance of persisting styles, contexts and choices, inherited from the colonial past, which give a particular character to the politics of science." 10 In Canada, the Department of National Health and Welfare's establishment and then termination of funding for four prosthetic research and technical units (PRTUs) to develop artificial limbs for children with pholecomic limbs reflected longstanding preoccupations with regional representation, the role of a strong central government and productive relationships among regions and these public institutions. 11 In the US, the rise and fall of powered upper-limb funding programs occurred in the context of discussions within the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) about the transformative power of science, expansion of the frontiers of knowledge, and its application within industry.
This "why" question is different than the more traditional question that seeks to assess the positions of leaders and laggards in the emergence of science, on the assumption that national-science cultures moves through a series of stages taking a nation from scientific dependency to self-Although the needs of World War I veterans drove growth in the design of prosthetics in the postwar period, it was not until World War II that governments became active in supporting research. In Canada, the Department of Veterans Affairs was charged with the responsibility to manufacture, fit, and service all prosthetic appliances for veterans in 1916. The department's research mission was not added until 1944. 14 Canada was not alone in these developments. In 1917 the US Surgeon General of the Army called limb makers to Washington to discuss the problem of supplying artificial limbs to veterans of World War I. But only in 1945 did the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) organize a sponsored cooperative research-and-development (R&D) program to address issues in the field. 15
The motivation for the new research mission came in part from the International Conference on Amputations and Artificial Limbs, held in Ottawa, and at the Christie Street Hospital, Toronto, in February 1944. It was organized by the Canadian National Research Council (NRC) and was attended by representatives from the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and the Soviet Union (USSR). According to a history of Canadian rehabilitation during the period by NRC employee Walter Woods:
[The meeting]...laid the foundations for scientific study of the subject. Arising from this meeting the Advisory Committee on Artificial Limbs, National Research Council, US, the Standing Advisory Committee on Artificial Limbs, British Ministry of Pensions, and the Associate Committee on Artificial Limbs, National Research Council, Canada were formed to direct the study of fundamental data, improvements of materials and development of prostheses. 16
It was after World War I that the concept of using myoelectric signals in stump muscles for control of a mechanical hand was first demonstrated in a bench-top electric prosthetic hand in Berlin in 1919. However, the use of myoelectric control would have to wait for the end of the next world war. The device was developed by Ronald Reiter during his graduate studies in physics at the University of Munich from 1944 to 1948. The system he designed and built was also a literal bench-top tool due to its dependence upon AC electricity and a vacuum-tube amplifier the size of an attaché case. 17 Although the device used a three-state controller and proportional control as devices do today, it never proceeded to clinical investigation. 18 Reiter stated that in 1948, "the political and economic conditions in Germany were not conducive to further work on the project." 19 Although published, the work would only be rediscovered after the initial development of similar myoelectric systems in the 1960s.
As with space rocketry, the most sensational developments of myoelectrically controlled hands in the late 1950s occurred in the USSR. The concept of using electrical signals from muscles to control a prosthesis was formulated in 1957 by a joint group at the Machine Research Institute and the Central Research Institute. 20 At the 1958 World's Fair in Brussels, the USSR's pavilion of new technological breakthroughs showcased the myoelectric-forearm prosthesis powered by a miniature DC motor and battery pack worn on the amputee's belt. The design was to have significant influence in the United Kingdom and Canada, where rights were licensed for manufacturing. Worldwide, it raised expectations about what could be done for amputees and provided fuel for scholarly and popular science articles on the future of the human-machine interface and the field of cybernetics.
Histories
There has been more written about the rise and fall of upper-limb prosthetics R&D funding programs in the US than in Canada. The consistent view among articles on the origin of US programs is that they were driven by the desire to provide artificial limbs for World War II veterans and the assumption that progress would be achieved by a science-based program. There is less consensus on the reasons for the disestablishment of US programs.
Dudley Childress, a former director of the Prosthetics Research Program at Northwestern University characterized the period from 1945 to 1965 in the US as driven by US federal government funding programs to address the needs of World War II veterans and to remedy "the relatively primitive nature of prosthetics and orthotics previous to that time." 21 This was accomplished by not only the commitment of funds to R&D by governmental agencies, but also "the effective coordination of research efforts and evaluation projects brought about by the Committee on Prosthetics Research and Development (CPRD) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)." 22 He underlined the importance of the connection: "The NRC venue was key to the success of the Committee because the NRC imprimatur provided the Committee and its successors with national prominence, recognition, and credibility for the next 30 years." 23 According to Childress, "by 1965, or thereabouts, many of the fundamental principles currently used in prosthetics had been established. Advancements since then seem to have emphasized technical developments, with less concentration on principles than during the previous 20-year period." 24 Technical progress occurred through the introduction of new materials, such as thermoplastics and composites, new socket designs, commercial availability of electric powered arm components and myoelectric controls, and computer-aided-design and computer-aidedmanufacturing (CAD/CAM). This, according to Childress, was an important part of the undoing of the CRPD and the associated funding for prosthetics R&D in the late 1970s as it allowed the NAS to justify budget cuts because the work was too development-focused and did not emphasize science-based investigation.
Another insider account in the US was written by Robert Gailey, director of the Miami Veterans Affairs Healthcare Systems Functional Outcomes Research and Evaluation Center and a professor at the University of Miami School of Medicine. 25 Like Childress, Gailey argued it was World War II that drove the creation of government programs and funding for fundamental prosthetic research. In Gailey's narrative, prosthetic research funding dried up from the late 1970s through the 1990s, as the primary cause for loss of limb changed from trauma to diabetes and dysvascular disease, and the funding priority shifted to fundamental research in the new areas as well as prevention of amputation.
A. Bennet Wilson, a former technical director and director of the US National Academy of Science's CPRD, shares with Gailey the thesis that major wars are the stimulus for development of improved prostheses. 26 Likewise, he wrote that the results of this post-war research was responsible "for delineating the basic principles of fitting and alignment." 27 Wilson, like Childress and Gailey, was a participant in the battles over the future of the National Academies of Sciences' CPRD and Committee on Prosthetic-Orthotic Education (CPOE) in the 1970s, and so his narrative reflects his experience as an officer of the CPRD. The fall of the organization was a hard blow for Wilson, and as part of the change he resigned his position at the CPRD. Wilson wrote that no new programs were initiated to develop and commercialize powered upper-limb products.
One of the few surveyors of the field in both Canada and the US was a Canadian engineer, Douglas Hobson, who like Childress worked in the field from the 1960s to the 1990s. He referred to the period from 1945 to 1960 as "the Prosthetics and Orthotics Heyday." 28 Like Childress, his view was that the field was driven by returning veterans with amputations who "created the political and social will to do something to compensate veterans for their tremendous personal sacrifice." 29 He characterized the field, somewhat nostalgically, as rising with the will created first by World War II, the polio epidemic in the early 1950s, the thalidomide tragedy in the 1960s, and finally the The fall in Hobson's history came in 1976, when the National Academy of Sciences disbanded the CPRD. According to Hobson, this resulted in decreased levels of interagency and international collaboration in rehabilitation technology. Efforts were made to find another home for the CPRD, but this never materialized as its two main funding partners, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and the Veterans Administration (VA), were now focused on the development and support of rehabilitation engineering centres. Thus, while US funding bodies shifted from grant-funding of individual researchers to institutional funding of centres, in Canada, the federal government ended funding for the four research centres at the universities of British Columbia, Winnipeg, Toronto, and New Brunswick in the mid-1970s, and charged the Canadian National Research Council with leading the development of electronic super limbs. The effect, however, was similar in that funding for university-based R&D was cut in both Canada and the United States. The difference is that in the US, the Veterans Administration Office of Research and Development developed internal centres for rehabilitation in New York and Tampa. In Canada, responsibility for prosthetics R&D moved to Ottawa.
David Serlin, an American historian and researcher in the field of disability studies, provides an alternative historical account in two essays. 32 He divides his history into pre-and post-World War II. His central argument is that the physical design and construction of prostheses help[ed] to distinguish the rehabilitation of veterans after World War Two from earlier periods of adjustment for veterans. Prosthetics research and development in the 1940s was catalyzed, to a great extent, by the mystique of scientific progress. The advent of new materials science and new bioenegineering principles during the war and the applications of these materials and principles to new prosthetic devices helped to transform prosthetics into its own biomedical subdiscipline. 33
To bring plastics and engineering into patriotic service for veterans, the US National Academy of Sciences "funded and supported advanced prosthetics research, especially at university and military laboratories." 34 The first US program for power-driven artificial limbs was announced in late August 1945, two weeks after the war with Japan ended. In Serlin's narrative, science, engineering, technology, military-industry production techniques, and government funding programs of the 1940s to 1960s were pressed into the service of a larger strategy and cultural preoccupation. He writes that " [t] he association between amputees and state-of-the-art prosthetics research may have been an intentional strategy to link disabled veterans with the positive, futuristic aura surrounding military-industrial science." 35 Why the need for the aura? It was the "postwar preoccupation with masculinity and productivity" and "among other things, the fiercely heterosexual culture of postwar psychology, especially in its orthodox zeal to preserve the masculine status of disabled veterans." 36 Cultural ideals emerge as the primary force in the project to make the damaged male body productive. What Serlin characterizes as "perhaps the greatest conceptual challenge to modern industrial capitalism" was met by the development of prostheses such as the cable-driven hand designed by Henry Dreyfuss for the US Veterans Administration. 37
In Serlin's history, the primary force is post-war American culture and the ideal of the masculine, productive, able-bodied man. Science provides its mystique of progress and materials. Clinical research determines the power source, electric, not hydraulic or pneumatic. Engineers and prosthetists, the primary agents of the post-war American cultural ideal, operate in the foreground, practicing their engineering design and construction of devices. 38
Origins in the United States
In the US, the federal government responded to World War II veterans through the sponsorship of R&D, education and training programs, and conferences. The US National Academy of Sciences discovered that little modern scientific effort had gone into the development of artificial limbs and in 1945 initiated a "crash" research program funded by the VA Office of Scientific Research and Development. The state-of-the-art devices in 1945 were shoulder powered, artificial limbs for adult arm-amputees, using cables to open and close a wooden, mechanical hand. For children, it was cable-controlled hooks, as artificial hands had not been developed in small sizes. 39 One of the major outcomes of this VA-sponsored program came from a project at International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). IBM investigated the concept of an electric arm and then developed a device with internal financial support and from the VA. 40 From that project came the realization that arm amputees could not control the electric arm without conscious thought, and that for most amputees the level of effort to control a prosthesis exceeded the benefits received. The suggestion was that future research should focus on electric-arm control.
The VA program lasted for two years. In 1947, the National Academy of Sciences, on advice from its advisory committee on artificial limbs, set up a new program to fund research at universities and industrial laboratories. This program lasted 30 years, from 1947 to 1977, with a major change in 1955 when NAS created the Prosthetics Research Board (PRB) to run this program. In 1959, the PRB created two committees, the committee on prosthetics research and development (CPRD) and the committee on prosthetics education and information (later called the committee on prosthetics and orthotics education) or CPOE, all of which continued until 1977 when the National Academy of Sciences dissolved the board and committees. Until its dissolution, the CPRD emerged as the major national coordinator of upper limb R&D funding.
The broad mission of these programs was not just to replace wood with plastic and leather straps with suction-cup sockets, and muscle with batteries and motors, but to understand the human body. The 1962 publication Progress in Prosthetics described how modern science would hopefully work on technology from the mid-1940s onwards: "The first decade of this research was of the patient, painstaking basic type which usually precedes dramatic discoveries in science. Now, breakthroughs are in sight which could bring prosthetics fully into step with this new age of electronics." 41 According to the authors, the process would unfold this way: "Developmental devices and techniques progress through four phases-basic research, model development and evaluation, clinical and field studies, and production by the limb industry. " 42 As in Serlin's history, the origins of the externally powered program were founded on the premise that science would show the path of progress. Clinical researchers were expected to sorts out the details of power sources. Engineers and prosthetists would design and construct devices. The major difference is that the underlying cultural goal was not the ideal of the masculine, productive, ablebodied man, but the realization of the cybernetic system.
Norbert Weiner conceptualized the human-cybernetic system in his 1948 book Cybernetics. 43 The book's origins were in Weiner's research during World War II on "predicting the future positions of fast-flying airplanes." 44 Underlying cybernetics was the observation that the information processing required to determine the position of enemy fighter planes was the same as that which lay at the root of all intelligent behavior...[such as]...light-and heat-seeking movements by plants and primitive creatures; homeostatic processes such as the body's internal mechanisms for regulating appetite and temperature; and virtually every form of higher-order animal behavior. All those purposeful actions were governed by circular communication processes and guided to their goals by error-correcting negative feedback. " 45 In Cybernetics, Wiener addressed the application of cybernetic theory to prostheses. The promise was not just to control a prosthesis, but also to receive sensory-feedback information to further enhance control and prosthesis movement. Weiner wrote:
There are two other fields where I ultimately hope to accomplish something practical with the aid of cybernetic ideas, but in which this hope must wait on further developments. One is the matter of prostheses for lost or paralyzed limbs...The loss of a segment of limb implies not only the loss of the purely passive support of the missing segment or its value as mechanical extension of the stump, and the loss of cutaneous and kinesthetic sensations originating in it. The first two losses are what the artificial-limb maker now tries to replace. The third has so far been beyond his scope ...What we have said about the leg should apply with even more force to the arm, where the figure of the manikin familiar to all readers of books of neurology shows that the sensory loss in an amputation of the thumb alone is considerably greater than the sensory loss even in a hip-joint amputation. 46 Although not everyone was clear what cybernetics meant or that it had a single meaning, the concept of the human cybernetic system fit well with the more general idea that science would show the way of progress in powered upper-limb technology development, clinical and field studies, and commercial production. 47 The concept, alongside the Boston Arm in the 1960s and the Utah Arm in the 1960s, inspired researchers in the field. 48
Although the arm in Figure 1 appears to be a male arm-consistent with representations of users of non-powered upper-limb prosthetic devices-contemporary engineering researchers, prosthetists, and occupational therapists considered children to be ideal users of this technology. According to them, children had the capacity to become "natural" users of powered devices, an ability akin to becoming proficient speakers of other languages. 50 "Here, age and motivation are important," as the two researchers who produced Figure 1 noted, "for example, "thalidomide children" show tremendous learning capacity with complex prostheses, while many geriatric lower-extremity amputees are not able, or are not motivated, to use an artificial leg." 51
Canada
Themes in Canada's approach to prosthetics services were present from World War I, including the significant role of the federal government in product and service delivery, collaboration among Canadian institutions, and coordination of services among regions. Based on recommendations by a federal government commission headed by Dr. Clarence L. Starr, the chief physician at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto, and future professor of surgery at the University of Toronto, Canada's Department of Veterans Affairs operated all parts of the system through Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto. This included manufacture, supply, fitting, and servicing of prosthetic devices for veterans free-of-charge. In keeping with prosthetic manufacturing practices in the US, Germany, and elsewhere following World War I, the development activities focused on the standardization of material and parts, and reduction of production costs. The central limb factory, located in Toronto at Sunnybrook Hospital, served eleven other centres located in cities across Canada.
As in the US, concerns about re-establishment of veterans into civilian life were behind the financing of prosthetic programs. During the inter-war period concerns were expressed about the pension and unemployment insurance payments to veterans. As well, there was a perception that large numbers of veterans had failed to re-establish themselves in civilian life. A 1936 study of employed by the Veterans' Assistance Commission found that the great majority of disabled veterans were unskilled. 52 Canada also shared with the US the view that science and engineering would be applied to getting disabled veterans into productive work and family life. Writing about Canada's Department of Veterans Affairs in the 1940s, Walter Woods noted that the department's prosthetic services were designed "to provide scientific physical rehabilitation of the disabled veteran which is so essential to his establishment in a useful occupation." 53 But there were differences in how and when that mission of science-based rehabilitation was implemented in the US and Canada. Although Canada's National Research Council hosted the International Conference on Amputations and Artificial Limbs in Ottawa in 1944, and formed an Associate Committee on Artificial Limbs to provide direction to research on artificial limbs, little happened in Canadian research until 1949. In that year a laboratory facility was opened at the Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto, and the first research engineer was hired, Colin McLaurin. 54 James Foort, who would subsequently lead the Winnipeg Prosthetic Research and Training Unit (PRTU) in the early 1960s, described the laboratory facilities they had in 1951 as a "broom closet made available when the janitors moved to better quarters." 55 In contrast to the American fundamental-research program to develop a powered upper limb, the focus in Canada in the 1950s was on making existing body-powered and mechanical-hand prostheses more useful through the use of new plastics and materials, novel suction-socket fittings, and cosmetic gloves. The NRC provided direction on this applied research, advising on new materials and techniques, and performing testing at its laboratories.
Although there were differences in approaches to research agendas, strong linkages existed between the two countries. If the normal development pattern of the infant is to be met, these cases must be immediately referred to other specialists for the early provision of limb prostheses; probably as early as two months of age. The fitting of the such apparati is only the beginning: training the child to use and live with his new limbs will demands years of of care and supervision through the resources of a rehabilitation centre. Social, vocational and psychiatric problems, in addition to recognized paediatric and orthopaedic disabilities, will arise and co-operation between the many specialties involved in the team will be essential. 61
The department took action, providing $200,000 annually (starting in 1963) for three research and training units at the Rehabilitation Institute of Montreal, the Ontario Crippled Children's Centre (OCCC) in Toronto, and the Rehabilitation Hospital in Winnipeg. 62 The units were chosen because they offered teaching hospitals associated with medical schools. As the authors of the 1962 The Report of the Expert Committee of the Habilitation of Congenital Anomalies Associated with Thalidomide wrote: "limb abnormalities...can usually be met by existing paediatric facilities, particularly within university centres." 63 It was here that the expert committee wanted the training courses to be located because of the already, "very close relationships between the prosthetist, the physiatrist, and the orthopaedic surgeon." 64
The other major component of the research strategy, to directly involve electrical engineer researchers in the teaching hospitals, was implemented as an afterthought. The expert committee made no recommendations for involvement of electrical engineers among the list of critical professionals to be associated with these units. 65 This was surprising because the expert committee foresaw that "[t]he use of external power in artificial limbs is in its infancy, and will undoubtedly be required in the long-term management of severely involved phocomelic children." 66 The concept of getting engineers to work in hospitals was buried in the last appendix to the expert committee report, in a paper prepared by the Department of Veterans Affairs prosthetic service centre. 67 Although the paper focused on the prescription and fitting of prosthetic appliances, it noted that external power projects were new and development would be needed to design upper-limb prostheses, and the requirement for research to be, "performed by specialized people in research establishments...and that a method of coordination be established" for the research units. This resulted in the inclusion of a fourth PRTU, the University of New Brunswick's Bioengineering Institute. 68
The origins of the Canadian powered upper-limb programs were similar to the American program for World War II veterans in that they both arose in response to a specific crisis and to address the perceived needs of a user group. But whereas the American response saw a lack of science in the field and a need to address this gap with fundamental studies, including involvement of industry in these studies, the Canadians saw the need for interdisciplinary teams at teaching hospitals in three regions that could do the work, and belatedly they brought electrical-engineering researchers into the clinics. Although Canadian policy-makers saw powered upper limbs on the research horizon, and fundamental research issues to solve, no similar approach to the US "crash" program emerged in response to the thalidomide crisis. 69
The "crash" fundamental-research project begun in America in the mid-1940s resulted in a variety of projects to study and develop upper-limb power devices. These were undertaken in government, university, and industrial facilities. One of the earliest US government funded projects to produce an electrically-powered artificial arm occurred at New York University in the early 1950s. The research findings were that a myoelectric signal from muscle contractions varied in accordance with the size and location of the electrode as well as the type of contraction 70 Evident of the early days of university-technology transfer, the researchers wrote in their paper that "[t]hese research findings were passed on to the Prosthetic Research Division of the International Business Machines Corporation for practical application." 71 The passing of research findings, however, did not end in the commercialization of a device. More influential to the long-term orientation of the field was research in the late 1950s at the University of California at Los Angeles that investigated whether electroencephalographic (EEG), electroneurographic (ENG), or myoelectric signals were the most promising for prosthetic device control. The authors favoured myoelectric control and outlined a number of concepts that would eventually be used in device designs. 72 It established the basic design concept for powered upper-limb devices that would guide North American R&D for the next half century.
During the period from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, the design of major commercial products occurred at MIT, the University of Utah, UNB, and the Ontario Centre for Crippled Children. At MIT, electrical engineer Robert Mann began design on what would become the Boston Arm, inspired by Weiner's cybernetic concepts. After substantial re-design by staff at Liberty Mutual following user trials in the 1970s, it became the first commercial myoelectrically-controlled elbow. At the University of Utah's Center for Engineering Design, a student of Robert Mann, Steven Jacobsen, began work on the Utah Arm in the early 1970s. In Canada, UNB's Institute for Biomedical Engineering began development of its three-state control system for powered limbs, which was to become the first North American control system in 1965. 73 And in the late 1960s, at the OCCC in Toronto, staff began work on the design of electronic elbows and hands for use by children. As with the Boston Arm, the design of the Utah Arm and devices at UNB and OCCC would all be strongly influenced by the movement of development into clinics and the involvement of users in the design process.
The line between experimental design and commercial product was fuzzy. Work to create products from these four initiatives was described by faculty and staff as biomedical-engineering design. It was experimental in that the newly designed or redesigned products were subject to testing in the laboratory and with patients in clinics, and, in some cases, the publication of results and new design work. But ever-changing designs and the lack of uptake by amputees, not to mention a likely lack of profitability, made the products something less than commercial products.
Although the commercial upper-limb myoelectric devices developed during the period shared many commonalities, the influence of local preoccupations can be seen in the artifacts in figures 2, 3 and 4. The circa-1965 UNB myoelectric-controlled upper limb in Figure 3 and circa-1977 VASI myoelectric-controlled upper limb with UNB myoelectic control unit in Figure 2 show the dramatic change from the purely functional "pliers on wires" approach to a naturalistic design, influenced by users in clinics who wanted prosthetic arms and hands that looked "natural," and the policy prescription to locate engineering-design activities in hospitals. This response to user feedback was addressed, in part, by re-designing the system to incorporate the batteries into the forearm, as illustrated in The Boston Arm also evolved to incorporate user-feedback as it moved from MIT faculty and student-led projects in the 1960s to product-development work at Liberty Mutual in the early 1970s. However, notice the boxy design of the covering over the elbow area of the Boston Arm in the foreground of Figure 4 , suggesting that the central preoccupation was with achievement of the engineering goals for functionality, not achievement of the naturalistic appearance.
The division between cybernetic and user-oriented approaches to the field can also be seen in the names of new journals founded in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Disestablishment in the United States
In 1977 the CPRD, the coordinating body of prosthetics R&D in the US, was dissolved by the National Academy of Sciences because of concerns about the lack of science in its research program. Since its inception in 1959, the CPRD had coordinated funds from the federal agencies to direct the national research efforts in prosthetics. It held meetings on R&D progress and needs, evaluated products and techniques, published documents, reviewed research proposals, and promoted education. According to Childress, the "CPRD was action orientated. On the other hand, the NAS was primarily an advisory group, and this difference in organizational function led to conflict between NAS and CPRD. In the mid 1970s, this conflict of operating styles resulted in CPRD losing its position within the NAS, which had been its "Alma Mater" for more than 30 years." 75 The demise of the CRPD was at least three years in planning. Ironically, CRPD insiders, including Clinton Compere and Colin McLaurin, called for the wind-down of the body in a 1973 review and report. 76 They suggested reorganizing CPRD and CPOE, and upgrading them from committee status to a unified "Board on Rehabilitation Engineering for the Musculoskeletal and Sensory Systems." The vision was for a body that would not only coordinate fundamental studies and device development, but also have broad responsibilities in evaluation, education, and service realms. 77
[Insert figures.]
This report was not acted upon. What was happening in the background was the transfer of the CPRD and CPOE from the National Academy of Sciences' Division of Engineering and Industrial Research to the newly created Assembly of Life Sciences. In early 1974, the Assembly of Life Sciences funded a project to review NAS activities in the field of prosthetics, orthotics, and sensory aid research, development, and education. The project was led by a visiting committee chaired by Dr. Melvin Glimcher, the Harriet M. Peabody professor of orthopaedic surgery at Harvard Medical School, and orthopaedic surgeon-in-chief at the Children's Hospital Medical Center in Boston. He was also a long-time champion of the cybernetics approach to prosthetic-system development and a strong critic of what he saw as the short-term apparatus focus of the engineering-oriented CPRD and CPOE. 78 The visiting-committee members included three other professors of medicine and a professor of engineering and applied physics from Harvard University, as well as two NAS staff members. The visiting committee first met on June 28, 1974 in Washington, DC, and the 222-page transcript of their meeting provides a fascinating glimpse into its operation and its members.
Glimcher, the visiting-committee chair, emerged as the strongest personality in the record. 79 At the meeting of the visiting committee on September 3-5, 1974, it was agreed that Glimcher would prepare an initial draft of the committee's final report. 80
The report's main conclusions were that the "CPRD/CPOE can no longer continue to respond to the needs of the Federal agencies and the handicapped in a manner commensurate with the high standards of the NAS." Core problems identified by the visiting committee included that the CPRD and CPOE committees had not met in the past three years; had devolved responsibilities and authority to staff; prepared reports that were not first-rate; and directed peer reviews of grants and contracts for the Veterans Administration that were "woefully inadequate in terms of overall evaluation for scientific merit." 81 The recommendation was that the NAS "should undertake promptly a fundamental reorganization of its professional and administrative structure, and its organization, in the area concerned with the rehabilitation of the handicapped in order to be able to discharge its important responsibilities to the nation in a manner consistent with the highest professional standards." 82 According to the visiting committee, the field of rehabilitation research had expanded beyond prosthetics and orthotics and the CPRD had failed to "broaden the accumulation of knowledge in this particular field, and to hasten its useful application to the handicapped population. 83 Among its strongest criticism of the CPRD was that
[i]nstead of viewing their charge as one which involves a broad scope of basic and applied biomedical research, in addition to innovative development and sound engineering, so as to encourage truly signal advances, their attention remains fixed essentially as it has been in the past: an inordinate emphasis upon the relatively short-term development of immediately useful apparatus. 84
The report was restricted in its distribution, and was limited to 50 copies. 85 Nevertheless, word leaked out about the visiting committee's conclusions and recommendations. Criticism of the report and the study came from CRPD staff, Douglas Hobson, then technical director of the University of Tennessee's Crippled Children's Hospital School, R. N. Scott of UNB, and many others. Dr. Colin McLaurin, chair of the CPRD, and A. Bennet Wilson, Jr. executive director of the CPRD, resigned their positions, as did a number of CRPD staff. 86 It was all to no avail. Even a letter from the director of the Veterans Administration Research Center for Prosthetics, a major funder of CRPD/CPOE activities, did not prevent the anticipated termination of the two committees. The letter suggested that the CPRD/CPOE would be better located in an assembly or commission of the NAS other than life sciences, as past history had shown successful operation of the CPRD/CPOE in the former division of Engineering and Industrial Research. At the January 17-18, 1977 meeting of the executive committee of the Assembly of Life Sciences, the development of a new, more broadly focused rehabilitation committee was approved, sealing the fate of the CPRD/CPOE.
Underlying the plan for wind-down of the two committees was an alternative vision of science and technology in biomedical science, emphasizing a much greater role for fundamental research. The vision was expressed in a NAS report titled Science and Technology in the Service of the Physically Handicapped. 87 It was authored by a committee of the NAS's Assembly of Life Sciences and chaired by Walter Rosenblith, provost of MIT. Two of the eleven co-authors included Stephen Jacobsen and Robert Mann, lead designers of, respectively, the Utah Arm and the Boston Arm. With respect to powered upper-limb prostheses, the focus was on the separation of fundamental and applied research, and the role of cybernetics. 88 The report argued that:
The business of science is the search for new knowledge. A useful partition of research is into basic or fundamental research versus applied or goal-oriented research. Both are vital in the advance against handicapping conditions. Basic research tends to follow disciplinary lines, leading the investigator wherever the theory or data take him. Although nonspecific to handicapping conditions, basic neurophysiological research into the central nervous system, for example, leads to sensory input and motor control information central to cybernetic limb prostheses and sensory orthoses. 89
Later in the same section the authors wrote of applied research:
The boundary between basic and applied research, however, is almost always somewhat blurred. In contrast to the search for new knowledge, applied medical research identifies a specific need in a target population and designs a device or therapy to satisfy that need. But, for example, research in prosthetics does not necessarily begin that way. Instead it may begin in relation to theoretical aspects of cybernetics, just as much biomedical research relates to fundamental knowledge in biochemistry. For example, research on multiple-degree-offreedom, power-driven, upper-and lower-limb prostheses with force and position feedback using electromyographical signals on the man machine interface should be classified as basic research, at least for the present. 90
This was more than a mere acknowledgement of the porous boundaries of the concepts. It was part of an attempt to reposition research and policy in powered upper-limb systems, from an orientation of engineering design of devices for users to a basic research field that examined theoretical concepts of cybernetics and the man-machine interface through the design, procurement, construction, and testing of devices. But as with the attempt to save the CPRD and CPOE, it was unsuccessful.
A week after the report was issued, on January 24, 1977 , the CPRD and CPOE were finally disestablished. 91 It was the end of an era in the field of upper-limb myoelectric prosthesis R&D.
Termination of PRTUs in Canada
In Canada, the process to terminate support for the PRTUs in 1975 was more straightforward. The plan in 1963 had been to terminate funding in 1972, although it was extended for a few years. Behind the scenes there were discussions of the federal government strategy for prosthetic services given the planned wind-up of the four PRTUs. Originally created in 1916 by the Department of Veterans Affairs, responsibility for prosthetic services was subsequently handed over to the Department of National Health and Welfare. The issue before the Department of National Health and Welfare was how to restructure the national strategy in light of the planned wind-ups of the PRTUs.
By the early 1970s it was becoming clear to the Department of National Health and Welfare that PRTUs had been unable to meet its goal of providing useful devices for victims of the thalidomide tragedy. This was not for lack of trying or development of useful devices for upper-limb amputees. Many of the children affected by thalidomide had residual upper limbs and fingers with sensation, and often the digits were functional. What became clear to developers was that covering these up with an artificial limb with no sensory input was unattractive to potential users.
To help the Department of National Health and Welfare develop its strategy for prosthetic services, the federal government commissioned an independent report in 1973 from the chairman of the University of Ottawa's school of medicine sub-department of rehabilitation. Entitled "Prosthetic Services Study," 92 it concluded there were three solitudes: (i) the prosthetic services of the federal government, (ii) the commercial sector, and (iii) universities and hospitals. It found that "in most instances, Prosthetic Services [of the federal government] seem to be weak in the areas of prescribing, manufacturing, fitting and servicing upper extremity amputees; the Commercial Sector is often found to be weak in servicing and maintaining, etc." 93 The report concluded "[i]f consolidation of resources seems logical in some regions, a "national" approach seems desirable to Research and, furthermore, to meet the needs of those patients few in numbers who present complex problems." 94
The response from the federal civil service was highly critical of the report and argued for a large role for the federal government. Dr. J. D. Coping, a medical doctor with the Department of Health and Welfare, found the study "biased from the beginning." 95 The 1973 report he authored on behalf of the government's prosthetics services division called for a large role for the federal government's prosthetic services group, and raised questions about the university and clinicalresearch groups. 96 Coping saw problems with the supply side:
The volume of devices emerging from the several research units in Canada was grossly exaggerated at the time the [federal prosthetic services engineering, testing and training] Unit was set up, and after a year or two of operation, found itself in a position of having no new devices worthy of putting into production. They then undertook a programme of finding other researchers, testing commercially available products, doing some research work on their own and involving themselves in some special fitting cases in the Toronto area. 97
The emphasis was on continued operation of the federal government's prosthetics services division to conduct research, develop, and evaluate prosthetic and orthotic devices and techniques, and pilot, manufacture, and test designs from research groups in Canada. 98 An expanded role for the federal government would, according to the report, "bridge a gap between the researchers in the prosthetic and orthotic field-who determine the need for the special devices and components, design them to suit the need, build and test prototypes-and suppliers ...Their function ends when the product is in such a condition that commercial production can be arranged by any manufacturer." 99 It concluded there was a large role for the federal agency in the treatment of patients and development of appliance "on a scale for which no single private or institutionallybased facility could muster sufficient human or financial resources." 100 By 1977, it was resolved that prosthetist training and other responsibilities would be transferred from the department's centre at the Sunnybrook Hospital in Toronto to provincially-run hospitals, while production, engineering, testing, and training would be handed over to the National Research Council.
Conclusion
The consensus view is that the design of US upper-limb prosthetics R&D programs after World War II was based on the assumption that the field was in a dark-age and needed fundamental scientific research to open a path for subsequent development and design of modern prosthetic devices. Childress, Hobson, Gailey, Serlin, and others emphasize the divide of pre-and post-war periods, rather than the continuity, and that the divide was cleaved by US-government funding programs to undertake fundamental research. Less consensus exists on the reason for wind-down of these programs in the mid-to-late 1970s. We argue the reason for end of the CPRD, CPOE, and the associated funding programs was because NAS judged them to be deficient in the performance of biomedical research, including a failure to keep abreast of the expanding field of rehabilitation, a woefully inadequate process for evaluation of scientific merit of grants and contracts, and an inordinate emphasis on short-term design of devices. 101
These judgements were framed within the concepts of fundamental and applied research, and a distinction between a basic-research field oriented to investigation of cybernetic theories, and another directed to device development. According the NAS, CPRD's lack of attention to fundamental-research practices and advances meant it was also unable also meet its broad duty to useful application and innovative development for disability communities. In the context of the forces identified by Harrison and Hoberg in Canada-US regulatory affairs, the National Academy of Sciences emerged as the major policy entrepreneur behind the wind-up of the research funding for the field, acting on the deeply held belief in the new frontier of cybernetics and that science offered the best means to explore these unknown territories.
In contrast, the Canadian federal government's response to veteran-amputees was to hire an engineer and establish a workshop to apply new materials to prosthetic devices. In 1963 when the PRTU funding program was founded, the policy discussions focused on the importance of the location of work and clinic-based interdisciplinary relationships among prosthetists, physiatrists, orthopaedic surgeons, and, later, engineers. There was also an emphasis on creation of centres of expertise within regions, foreshadowing a preoccupation of Canadian science and technology policy with the creation of interdisciplinary-research networks and centres of excellence. Upon wind-down the policy focused again on relationships. But consistent with Canadian federal research policy of the period, the central theme that emerged concerned the need for a strong role for a federal institution to mediate the Canadian solitudes among hospitals, universities, industry, and the federal government. 102
The contemporary preoccupation in Canada with ideas of these solitudes, and the role of the federal government to bridge these divides as well as regional interests, recalls the view of MacLeod and Jarrell about persisting choices inherited from the colonial past and the enduring influence on the politics of science. 103 
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